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經濟學可能看起來是一門了無生氣的科學。
In its simplest models, prices elegantly balance supply and demand, magically directing individuals' pursuit of their own self-interest towards the GREater good.
在其最簡單的模型中，價格微秒地平衡了供求，把個人對於自身利益的追求魔術般地引向更大的好處。
In the real world, humans often undermine the greater good by grabbing whatever goodies their position allows them.
在現實世界中，人類經常是通過攫取地位許給他們的甜頭來突出更大的好處。
The best economic theorizing grapples with this reality, and brings us closer to understanding the role of power relationships in human interactions.
經濟學最好的理論化行為研究這種現實，並讓我們更接近於理解權力關係在人類交往中的角色。
This year's Nobel Prize for economic sciences—awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom—celebrates their study of economic power, and the tricky business of harnessing it to useful economic ends.
獎給奧利弗·哈特和本格特·霍爾姆斯特羅姆的今年的諾貝爾經濟學獎表彰的是他們關於經濟權力的研究以及把將其運用於有用的經濟目的的棘手之事。
Behind the dull-sounding “contract theory” for which the two were recognized lies an important truth: that when people want to work together, individual self-interest must be kept under control.
在兩人因之而得到承認的聽上去無趣的 “契約理論” 背後存在著一個重要的真相：當人們想要一塊工作時，個人的自身利益必須處於被控制之下。
For a chef and a restaurant-owner to work together productively, for example, the owner must promise not to use the power he has to change the locks in order to deny the chef his share of future profit.
例如，對於想要一起高效工作的廚師和餐館所有者來說，所有者必須承諾不會為了否認廚師的未來利潤份額而使用他手中的權力換鎖。
Mr Hart, a British economist working at Harvard University, tackled power dynamics while seeking to explain the existence of firms—a question which has troubled economists since the work of the late Ronald Coase, another Nobelist, starting in the 1930s.
在哈佛大學工作的英國經濟學家哈特，在處理了權力動力學的同時還試圖解釋企業的存在，這一問題，已故的另一位諾獎得主羅納德·科斯於上世紀30年代開始研究，一直困擾著經濟學家們。
Firms provide some advantage over dealing with others through exchanges of cash for services in the open market, but economists have struggled to pinpoint what that advantage is.
企業在開放市場用金錢交換服務與其他人做生意時提供了某種優勢，而經濟學家們試圖指出那個優勢是什麼。
The difficulty in writing contracts that cover all future situations seems to be crucial.
訂立囊括未來情況的契約的困難似乎很關鍵。
Agreeing beforehand how any hypothetical future windfall or loss ought to be shared can be impossible.
事先就任何假設中的未來盈利或損失應當如何分享達成一致應該是不可能的。
Yet the uncertainty of working without such a complete contract could be big enough to prevent potentially profitable partnerships from forming.
然而，沒有了一份如此全面的契約，工作的不確定性可能大得足以阻止潛在盈利夥伴關係的形成。
In work with Sanford Grossman, (an economist who might plausibly have shared the prize), Mr. Hart reasoned that firms solve this problem by clever use of the bargaining power bestowed by the ownership and control of key assets, such as machines or intellectual property.
在與桑福德·格羅斯曼 (一位本應合理地分享今年諾獎的經濟學家) 的合作中，哈特斷定，企業是通過對所有權以及機器和智慧財產權等關鍵資產的控制權所賜予的議價權的靈活運用來解決這一問題的。
Instead of fussing over how to divide up the spoils in every possible future, in other words, workers agree to sell their labor to a firm that owns the machinery or technology they use, in the knowledge that ownership gives the firm the power to hoover up a disproportionate share of the profits.
換言之，在知道所有權賦予企業得到不成比例的利潤份額的權力的前提下，工人會同意將其勞動出售給擁有他們所使用的機器或技術的企業，而不是為了如何在每一種可能的未來中分配戰利品而瞎操心。
This power comes with costs as well as benefits, which help shape how big companies become and exactly what they do.
這種權力除了帶來利潤之外，還帶來有助於形成公司規模和具體業務的成本。
In other work, Mr. Hart noted that workers and managers who look after equipment can make decisions to improve its productivity (like maintaining the machinery and investing in training).
在另外的研究中，哈特指出，維護裝置的工人和管理人員能夠做出提高生產效率的決定 (如維護裝置和投資於再培訓)。
But just how much time and energy they spend on such efforts depends on what share of future profits they can expect.
但是，他們會把多少精力用於此類努力則取決於他們所能期盼的未來利潤份額。