信危機及我國壽險市場逆向選擇問題的思考
摘 要：在資訊經濟學發展成爲當代主流經濟學重要組成部分的背景下，針對我國壽險市場中大量存在的壽險公司與投保方之間嚴重的資訊不對稱問題，本文着重從微觀資訊經濟學理論層面對我國壽險市場的逆向選擇問題進行研究。
本文論述了我國壽險市場上逆向選擇產生的`原因及其造成的不良後果，充分證明了我國保險業界解決資訊不對稱問題和防範誠信危機的重要性和緊迫性。透過構造保險市場囚徒困境博弈模型，並對各種可能促使保險雙方合作的機制進行比較，本文得出激勵機制是緩解資訊不對稱並有效解決我國保險市場囚徒困境的最優戰略。本文對Rothschild-Stiglitz資訊甄別模型進行了評述和借鑑，它構成本文針對我國壽險市場逆向選擇問題提出的各項對策建議的理論基礎。從對資訊甄別模型的分析和結論中，本文得到啓示：當壽險公司無法有效區分不同風險類別的投保人時，它可以在保險合同中設計1系列不同保障數額對應不同保費的保單組合供投保人自行選擇，然後透過觀察投保人的選擇來對他們的風險資訊進行甄別。最後，本文提出4種用以解決我國壽險市場逆向選擇問題的對策建議，包括: 設計相應的保險契約條款、加快建立保險企業信用評級制度、保險代理人激勵機制和建立完善保險資訊披露制度，並給出了具體的實施方案和修正意見。
關鍵詞: 資訊不對稱；資訊甄別；囚徒困境；保險企業信用評級
Comments on the Good Faith Crisis and the Reflection of the Adverse Selection Problems in Domestic Insurance Market
Abstract：Facing the development of information economics as an important part of modern economics and serious asymmetric information between our insurer and insured, the paper studies solutions to these asymmetric information problems in our insurance market from information microeconomics. The paper discusses causes and disadvantageous results of the insureds adverse selection in our insurance market respectively. It proves that solving our asymmetric information problems is very important and urgent. Then the paper constructs a prisoners dilemma model in insurance market and compares several mechanisms likely propelling cooperation between both insurance sides, which draws a conclusion that the incentive mechanism is the best strategy to alleviate information asymmetry and solve the prisoners dilemma in our insurance market. The paper describes and comments on the Rothschild-Stiglitz screening model of the partial equilibrium. It constitutes the papers theoretic problems in our insurance market. Through these analysis and conclusions of the models, the paper receives the revelation: When the life insurance company is unable the policy holder which effectively differentiates the different risk category, it may design series of different safe guards amount correspondence different insurance premium in the insurance contract the chit combination voluntarily to choose for the policy holder, then through observes policy holders choice to carry on to their risk information screens. In the end, the paper puts forward four methods to resolve the adverse selection problems in our insurance market, which include designing the corresponding insurance contract provision, Speeding up the establishment insurance enterprise credit rating system, the safe agent drove the mechanism and establishing the consummates insurance information to disclose the system. In the end, it eventually has produced the concrete implementation plan and the revision opinion.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Partial Equilibrium; Prisoners Dilemma; Insurance Enterprise Credit Rating System
